Wednesday, July 02, 2008

Women & the Office of Deacon in the PCA: The 36th General Assembly’s Decision


 

Female Deaconesses

  • As we have seen in previously, the PCA Book of Church Order makes it quite clear that there are only two ordained offices in the PCA: Elder & Deacon (BCO 7-2).
  • With regards to deacons we are told that they are to be ordained and that they are to be ordained and they are to be spiritual men (BCO 9-4).
  • In fact, both offices are open to men only (BCO 7-2).
  • This year's GA received an overture (#9) from Philadelphia Presbytery requesting that the GA "Erect a study committee on the deaconesses."
  • The GA committee to study this overture was comprised of approximately 70 members.
  • The net result was a minority and majority report.
  • The minority report requested a "balanced" study committee to report back at the 37th GA in Orlando.
  • The minority folks (Bryan Chapell of Covenant Seminary was their spokesman) listed 3 specific areas for the committee.
  • First, "Scriptural teaching bearing on the role of women in diaconal ministry."
  • Second, "Is the Book of Church Order more, or less, restrictive than the Scriptural teaching bearing on the role of women in diaconal ministries? If so, what potential changes to the BCO (in keeping with any findings proceeding from the study of Scripture) might be considered for future Presbytery overtures?"
  • Third, "Offer pastoral advice on what might be an appropriate range of practices related to women serving in diaconal ministry and give guidance regarding our current differences in practice among PCA churches."
  • In their "Grounds," the minority stated: "Given the existence of a variety of practices on this issue, many have found the language of BCO 7-2 and BCO chapter 9 to be insufficient to answer questions such as those from Overture 9 from the Philadelphia Presbytery."
  • What are some of those questions? Let's take a look at them.

Questions Considered

  • First, may churches choose not to ordain any male deacons?
  • Second, may churches choose to commission but not ordain male deacons?
  • Third, may women be commissioned as deaconesses without ordaining them as deacons?
  • Fourth, may the same constitutional questions, or similar questions, used to ordain be used to commission deacons or deaconesses who are not ordained?
  • Fifth, may churches elect ordained men and commissioned women to serve together in the diaconate? (Note: 9-7 states: "It is often expedient that the session of a church should elect and appoint godly men and women of the congregation to assist the deacons in caring for the sick, the widows, the orphans, the prisoners, and others who may be in distress or need.")
  • Finally, may churches use the title deaconesses for an elected position off ministry in the church or selected to serve according to BCO 9-7?
  • The minority adds, "There would be value in offering our congregations an historical and a comprehensive, exegetical, and hermeneutical analysis of Scripture's teaching concerning the role of women in the diaconal ministries."
  • Thankfully, the minority report failed.

A Historical Look

  • Let's take a historical look for a moment.
  • Actually, the PCA examined the issue of deaconesses when they were initially formed. You see the denomination they came out of, the PCUS, decided to begin ordaining women to church offices in 1964 and amended their own Book of Church Order to reflect that. Nine years later, when the PCA was formed, much of their book of church order was taken verbatim from the PCUS book of church order, so at that point the PCA could have simply adopted the existing practice of the PCUS and continued to elect and ordain women deacons. This practice, however, was rejected.
  • In 1973 the PCA determined that sessions could select and appoint godly women of the congregation to assist the deacons in their work, and in this a clear avenue was created for women who wish to formally serve the church to minister to the needs of others. Therefore it is incorrect to say the PCA is preventing women from serving the church, even in regards to diaconal care. Historically though, the controversy is not over having opportunities to serve, it is over whether women may hold ordained offices in the church.
  • Additionally, in 1982 when the PCA joined and received the RPCES they merged with a denomination that already had an office of "non-ordained" deaconesses, and yet the understanding was that the RPCES would conform to the PCA BCO on this point, and not vice versa.
  • With regard to Overture 9, the majority report answered, "Presbyteries are reminded that appropriate ways to bring these issues before the Assembly are through Presbytery overtures to amend the BCO, or by way of reference (BCO 41)."
  • The majority's "Grounds" read as follows: "BCO 7-2, chapter 9, and especially 9-7, provided a sufficient answer to the issues contemplated in Overture 9; the Presbyteries should work through the implications in their own local contexts. This is always subject to the actions noted in the text of the response."
  • The majority report passed.

Where Do We Move From Here?

  • So what now? Let me briefly outline a course of action.
  • First, at our stated meeting of South Coast Presbytery in September, Grace and whoever will join us will overture Presbytery to bring its practices into line with what is clearly stated in our PCA Constitution as given to us in the BCO.
  • Please pray for us as we put this document together and ask other neighboring churches to join us and sign it.
  • Also pray that the Presbytery meeting would go well because this is going to be an emotional discussion. Why?
  • Simply because we intended to inform those who refuse to come into line that we are going to report them to the Standing Judicial Committee of the PCA, which will, if necessary, bring punitive measures to bear.

Saturday, June 28, 2008

Dr. Greg L. Bahnsen's The Problem of Evil in Contemporary Form

In this post, I'm going to deal with, in particular with YAD. He postulated several points which deal with meta-ethics. What is Meta-Ethics?

Ethics

Ethics, as a broadly used term, deal particularly with the study of morals. In a broad sense, ethics judges what can be right or wrong, and whatnot. For Dr. Bahnsen, he characterized the problem of evil in this way:

Quote:

A well known passage from the pen of the Russian novelist, Fyodor Dostoyevsky (a great author by the way), readily stirs our emotions and makes us insistent about the wickedness of men, for instance men who are cruel to little children. It is found in his novel, Brothers Karamazov
. Ivan makes his complaint to Alyosha:

"People talk sometimes of bestial cruelty, but that's a great injustice and insult to the beasts; a beast can never be so cruel as a man, so artistically cruel....

I've collected a great, great deal about Russian children, Alyosha. There was a little girl of five who was hated by her father and mother.... You see, I must repeat again, it is a peculiar characteristic of many people, this love of torturing children, and children only.... It's just their defenselessness that tempts the tormentor, just the angelic confidence of the child who has no refuge and no appeal that sets his vile blood on fire....

This poor child of five was subjected to every possible torture by those cultivated parents. They beat her, thrashed her, kicked her for no reason till her body was one bruise. Then, they went to greater refinements of cruelty -- shut her up al night in the cold and frost in a privy, and because she didn't ask to be taken up at night... they smeared her face and filled her mouth with excrement, and it was her mother, her mother did this. And that mother could sleep, hearing the poor child's groans! Can you understand why a little creature, who can't even understand what's done to her, should beat her little aching heart with her tiny fist in the dark and cold, and weep her meek unresentful tears to dear, kind God to protect her?... Do you understand why this infamy must be and is permitted?... Why, the whole world of knowledge is not worth that child's prayer to 'dear, kind God'!.. .

Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only one tiny creature -- that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance -- and to found that edifice on its unavenged tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth."

"No, I wouldn't consent," said Alyosha softly. (Bahnsen, The Problem of Evil, pp.1-2)

Here Dr. Greg L. Bahnsen is illustrating a very basic concept of what people would consider ethical taboo. It is clear - it is assumed - that it is wrong to torture children. Now, I don't want to seem like some sort of masochist towards children, but for argument sake, let's follow the illustration. If we were to ask the following question that Ivan asks Alyosha, would we "consent" to this sort of architect? It would not only be politically incorrect to answer with a stern no!, but it is simply out of God's character to enjoy the suffering of children. Am I right? Wrong! Now don't get me wrong, I think it is tragic that children suffer the way they do, but if God really didn't want the suffering to continue, it would in fact stop. So then, how do we answer the atheist who decries Christians of having a god who is "uncompassionate"? Again, Bahnsen answers:

  1. God is completely good.
  2. God is completely powerful.

    Now these two premises in it of themselves provide no serious problem for the Christian. It isn't until we add the following premise -

  3. Evil exists.

    The Scottish skeptic David Hume (18th century) put it like this:

    "Is [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?"(Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, 88)

    It would seem like a logical contradiction. How then does the Christian solve this dilemma? We have contradictory premises - namely 1 and 2 which cannot comport with 3, say the logical positivist (a school of philosophy developed in its seminal form in Hume). Before I answer this question, let's see how this problem becomes a logical impossibility for the atheist:

    "What we find, then, is that the unbeliever must secretly rely upon the Christian worldview in order to make sense of his argument from the existence of evil which is urged against the Christian worldview! Antitheism presupposes theism to make its case. . .

    The problem of evil is thus a logical problem for the unbeliever, rather than the believer. As a Christian, I can make perfectly good sense out of my moral revulsion and condemnation of child abuse. The non - Christian cannot. This does not mean that I can explain why God does whatever He does in planning misery and wickedness in this world. It simply means that moral outrage is consistent with the Christian's worldview, his basic presuppositions about reality, knowledge, and ethics. The non - Christian's worldview (of whatever variety) eventually cannot account for such moral outrage. It cannot explain the objective and unchanging nature of moral notions like good or evil. Thus the problem of evil is precisely a philosophical problem for unbelief. Unbelievers would be required to appeal to the very thing against which they argue (a divine, transcendent sense of ethics) in order for their argument to be warranted" (Bahnsen, p.6).

Though this problem does pose a logical dilemma for the Christian, the atheist has no bases by which he can make his argument, for in doing so he undermines the intelligibility of the moral argument for God's existence. In effect, he is - as Dr. C. Van Til writes - on borrowed capital; that is, he is borrowing from the Christian worldview. He is doing so because he has no criteria by which to judge God. I would find any atheist hard pressed to find a logical consistency within his own ethic. However, the atheist is doing something that I think the Christians need to realize. There is an inconsistency in the way theist - Christian theist, for I argue for the God of the Bible - are arguing for God, namely His goodness.

"The problem of evil amounts to the charge that there is logical incoherence within the Christian outlook -- regardless of how much evil there is in the universe, compared to how much goodness can be found" (p.3).

The problem, as is illustrated by the quote above, shows that the problem is not about evidence but about a logical inconsistency. Christians ought to be concerned with the consistency of their view, especially in cases dealing with ethics. Though I disagree with YAD, he does show that if God were the god he shows himself to be (which that deity is not), then there's a logical inconsistency in most of what Christians believe:

"If the Christian presupposes that God is perfect and completely good -- as Scripture requires us to do -- then he is committed to evaluating everything within that experience in the light of that presupposition" (p.6).

Here Bahnsen shows that the presuppositions we have of the God of Scripture, therefore, ought to be justified in light of the God who is fully good and fully powerful. In essence, he [the Christian] ought to be consistent in his or her view of God - and I would add, the God of Scripture, though it be presupposed in light of "good" and "powerful."

Resolving the Paradox

So we return to our problem: How do we make sense of premises 1-3? The paradox (which is simply something that is seemingly contradictory) is resolved by adding the following premise:

  1. God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which exists.

I don't know why God does what he does in nature and in the dealings with men and women, but we do know that we have a God who is completely good and completely powerful, yet has a morally sufficient reason for the evil which exists. I don't believe we are in our epistemic rights in knowing "why" he does these "evil" things, but logically speaking the paradox is resolved and the problem disappears. The atheist here cannot breathe another argument, namely because he has no ethical criteria

Friday, June 20, 2008

The Spirit of Accepting the Spirit of “Newness” in the New Perspective on Paul: N.T. Wright and His Interpretation of Justification

For those who know of the ministry of Dr. Piper, we know two things about him:

  1. That his overwhelming desire if for the church to recognize that we are to enjoy God for glory of all peoples (his catch phraseology which can be found in Desiring God, his major and fundamental work).
  2. And that he has a commitment to Reformed doctrines of Grace; that is, he desires to for the church to recognize that Christ is sovereign, and that his rule establishes our joy for the glory of all peoples.

With that said, Dr. Piper—and I mention him by doctor for the reason of his polemic work, The Future of Justification—has begun a launch of polemic debate against the Bishop of Durham, Professor N.T. (Nicholas Thomas) Wright. However, Dr. Piper is not disingenuous to Professor Wright. He writes:

    The reason I take up controversy with N.T. Wright and not, say, J.D.G. Dunn or E.P. Sanders (all notable for their relationship to the so-called New Perspective on Paul) is that none of my parishioners has ever brought me a thick copy of a book by Dunn or Sanders, wondering what I thought about them. But Wright is popular and compelling writer as well as a rigorous scholar. Therefore, he exerts significant influence both in academic guild and among the wider public…In addition, Wright loves the apostle Paul and reverences the Christian Scriptures.

Piper recognized that Wright is not just a scholar. He recognizes that Wright has a particular love for Paul, the Resurrection, and the Historical Jesus. Of course, we cannot say it isn't the case with other scholars like, say, Dunn or Sanders. Wright, according to lecturers of the White Horse Inn, is great for topics, such as the resurrection of Christ and historicity of the person of Christ.

So then, what is the view of N.T. Wright in light of the Reformed view of Justification? Wright claims that we have misunderstood Paul in his historical setting. Dr. Wright writes, "It is, I think, a time for exploration and delighted innovation rather than simply for filling in the paradigms left by our predecessors…" He presumes that such an ad fontes appear more tenuous than the sources that led the Reformers to the doctrine of Justification by faith alone. Why not assume the opposite? It appears that Dr. Wright is ambiguous as to why one should be adduced rather than the other. On a similar note, Dr. Piper mentions that it is the case—that the text of the bible alone is just as tenuous as Second Temple Judaism, if not more so tenuous—and that we should not be so blithely candid in receiving the spirit of "newness" over against the established criterion of Scriptural interpretation.

Saturday, April 05, 2008

A Piece on Philosophy and Christian Theism

Does God Exists?

Here's another piece--hopefully not a redundant one. I don't expect to write the best piece in philosophy concerning Christian theism, but I hope to achieve something of a synopsis of what I think is the best answer to an atheists objection towards the rationality of Christian theism.

When I conduct debates with atheist, the common objection I face mostly is the idea of insufficient evidence. This argument already presupposes what the be used as evidence to begin with, thus begging the question--a logical fallacy. When I discussed this with an atheist, she stated that evidence is that which is verifiable by observation. This is only true if you depend mainly on the senses for what is deemed as evidence. In this sense, abstract notions like "laws" and "logic" in a sense cannot exists, because what can be known (epistemologically) can only be deduced or induced by the mere properties of the senses. Therefore, the notion of "evidence" is preemptive in its form, namely, if the Christian theist falls into this trap, he lost already.

My argument for God's existence (TAG): The more I read Bahnsen, Van Til, and Plantiga (& Wolsterstorff), I find that there are things in nature that avail to 'evidence' without the use of tangible things. For Dr. Bahnsen, abstract realities, like logic and laws, can exist and presuppose the existence of God. In this sense, God exists in se. Furthermore, there is this notion of proof that allows abstracts to constitute as proof. Again, when I debated with the atheist, she said that logic is a method of doing things. A Method? Well, in actuality, she was giving me a tautology. She didn't explain what logic is, but rather she told me what it acts like. My question was an ontological one: where is there such a thing as logic? I'll pose three laws:

(i) The law of identity: A=A

(ii) Non-contradiction: A is not -A

(iii) Law of Logical Certainty (a law based on possible certainty depending on ii).

Take rule 2 for instance: it always follows that one thing is the case while not the other case. Say I went work and I parked my car in a certain parking spot. In my mind--and in reality too--it is the case that my car is in that spot I parked it in and it's not the case that I parked it anywhere else (I'm assuming that my faculties are in order and reliable; I'm also using law iii.). If someone asks me, while I'm at work, where I parked my car I will use the evidence (laws ii and iii) to show that my car is parked in a certain spot.

But the atheist can't do that. In an atheist universe, he needs to account for abstracts like laws and logic, and he or she needs to do that through the senses; for the senses verify all evidence.

More misnomers of the "insufficient" evidence argument:

1. How much evidence is needed

2. What epistemic justification are we giving the evidence

3. What amounts to 'knowledge' in the epistemology of atheism

Notice the order I'm giving the 'evidence' argument. This is the method traditionally held that proves a proposition as knowledge. There are varying degrees that allow for nuances in each school of epistemology (proper, founheretism, nondoxastic, etc.), but this basic format I think even atheists will have a hard time disagreeing with.

Sunday, March 30, 2008

Interview with Dr. R. Gleason: Education Hysteria

The Polemics of Public Education and Privatized Home Schools & Private Institutions: An Interview with Dr. Ronald Gleason, Ph.D.

By Julio Martinez, Jr.

Question 1a: Professor Gleason, tell me about your history as it pertains to your education? Where you educated, and do you feel that you had a substantial and qualitative education?

(I want to first deal with the public schools and the system by which they function. I then want to discuss the private institutions of education, and ultimately compare the two forms of educating pre-collegiate students.)

Question 1b: Do you know of other professors and educators that are concerned about the education system, and if so, who?

Question 2: Upon my readings of the public school system, I learned that a recent measure was passed to boost graduation rates, otherwise known as the "No Child Left Behind" measure. Tell me your thoughts on this piece of legislation.

Question 3: What do you think the public school system can do to improve this measure, NCLB?

Question 4: Do you think that the national drop-out rate can be reduced by either reforming the NCLB measure, or scrapping it altogether?

Question 5: Can you tell me what you're thoughts are collectively about the public education system of state-run schools?

Question 6: What needs do you believe that the state does not meet with each student?

Question 7: According to the Legislative Analyst's Office, there are five basic goals the body politic believes can improve the state-run schools. They include: an academic push, early attention to low performing students, more personalized schools, a greater range of options, and parental involvement. Do you believe that these are theoretically palpable goals for the state-run schools?

Question 9: Do you believe some of these goals are conspicuous to the private school system?

Question 10: Again, the Legislative Analyst Office claims that if certain of these measurable goals are procured, they can hold students accountable which stipulate "consequences for failing to complete required work and strong attendance and truancy programs" (23). Do you agree? And if not, why?

Question 11: Lastly, what do you think will help the conspicuous problem of state-run schools?

Question 12: Private schools: your thoughts?

Question 13: Can you give me three general reasons why anyone—religious and non-religious— should pull their children from the public school system, which is free, to educate them privately?

Question 14: It has been maintained that the student who is taught at home lacks the social skills of those students who are in the public school system. Do you find this claim to be true?

Question 15: Do you have any reason to believe that students who are taught privately do procure a healthy social life?

Question 16: The quality of education is obviously important for students. Do you believe that the privatized system of education bequeaths this sort of education, a qualitative sort? Do you have any statistics that might support your belief?

(Finally, two basic questions which hint at a comparison of the two systems.)

Question 17: Cumulatively speaking, do you find that socialization is important for the student as he learns in the classroom/home? Can you compare the two scenarios in each system? Which system best socializes the student?

Question 18: Finally, if confronted with a parent with no religious background, what would you offer her in terms of educating her child? But before you answer, here's the scenario: She is ready to send her child to 1st grade, and she wants the best education possible. What would you say?

Saturday, March 08, 2008

Schriener: Theologian in Compromise with the New Perspective?

Thomas Schriener, adjunct professor at Bethel Theological Seminary of New Testament, wrote an essay on Luther. And in this essay—however, I only read a good majority of it—he writes that J. Dunn and the New Perspective (N.T. Wright) have raised awareness of the way modern Christians read the bible, i.e., Reformation spectacles. He concedes that Christians should not appear disingenuous when they approach the Scriptures with dogmatism. However "honest" his plight might seem, Luther still remains a champion in theology, even among Calvinists like myself. One would question Schriener's proclivity, even as a doctor of New Testament, when inundated by seemingly theological giants like Dunn and Wright. Here's the outline:


 

WAS LUTHER RIGHT?

By Tom Schreiner

(Professor of New Testament, Bethel Theological Seminary)

I. The impact of Luther

A. His understanding of God's righteousness

B. The danger of legalism (Roman Catholicism and Judaism)

C. The Bondage of the Will and human boasting

II. The consensus and Rudolf Bultmann

III. The consensus shattered: E. P. Sanders and Paul and Palestinian Judaism

A. Reading the NT through Reformation spectacles

B. Soteriology of Judaism: covenantal nomism

C. Why Sanders has persuaded many

D. The role of sola scriptura

IV. A reappraisal of Paul's criticism of Judaism

A. E. P. Sanders

1. Solution to plight

2. Salvation History

B. Heikki Räisänen: Contradictory Paul

1. Law fulfilled and abolished

2. Impossible to keep and yet kept by Christians

3. Purpose and origin of the law

4. Romans 2:12 and 5:13

C. James Dunn: Inclusivism

1. Weakness of Sanders and Räisänen

2. Meaning of "Works of Law"

3. Ethnocentricism not Legalism

V. An Evaluation of the new perspective

A. Legalism

B. Contradictions

C. Ethnocentricism vs. Legalism

Sunday, January 27, 2008

Going Crazy

I just watched the movie, I'm Reed Fish, and I thought it was an amazing movie. There were so many thoughts, ideas, etc., that crossed my mind. We live and move in our crazy lives, especially being Americans with our incessant business, our schools, and yet we forget why we do what we do. We simply come to realize that realization is simply not in the cards of finding ourselves. We become what Descartes called an empty machine. We do what we do, yet we don't know why.

After that, I began to think of other parcels of my life. I began to think of my past. I thought about redemption. Now I don't mean of that kind of divine recollection or penance. I mean that unique union with friends and family. (It's funny what movies can do in their powerful voices.) I began to think of friendships I quit. I also remembered of an old relationship I used to have. I wish I could have ended things better. I wish I would have stayed her friend. (I miss her so much.) The movie, like I said, was an inspiration. I can't stop thinking of the melancholy it infuses.

It also helped me think about the worrisome attribute that I constantly succumb to. I thought about my all-too-rationalistic mind. I think too much—in that I know I am no skeptic. It helped me see into the basis for such questioning and inquisition (and I'm speaking of the Spanish Inquisition either). Sometimes I just need to let it go—my mind. I know this may seem like frantic worry or some sort of neurotic psychosis. OK, maybe I'm being a bit paranoid. But still. My mind works like clock-work, it never stops. I worry about the way I put things together. For instance, I was reading in my Lit book for English about this guy names Funes. He was an obsessed memorious (ironically the article was called "Funes the Memorious"). If ever there was a clinical term—and I don't doubt there is—I'm sure he would fit it.

And there was also this other I saw before I clambered to this on Netflix. I saw the movie The OC. The reason I saw this was due to the artist Schuyler Fisk (she plays guitar). She was in both movies. Although I saw this one on iTunes, it was still a great movie. (iTunes has the sad video quality that Netflix doesn't have to deal with.) I believe if I hadn't perused her, I might have gone to sleep. Maybe there was some nostalgic feeling I wanted to recollect in watching her acting. It was amazing, I thought.

Depression is a good emotion. It makes you think of the loneliest emotion you usually never muse in, even in a fuddled state.