I think the title can be a bit misleading, so let me dispel some the connotations that possible arouse any suspicion about Anselmian logic and ontology. Most of the information I used was produced by the Standford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, in particular with section 2.1 hic Anselm.
The particular phrase that I'm concerned with is his "faith seeking understanding."[1]
Problem 1 (hereafter P1): Anselm seeks to replace faith with understanding.
P2: These proofs, though intelligible for the faithful, are intended for the believer only, though they should be convincing for the non-believer as well.
P1 has the major flaw I think to say that all of faith is comprised in reason. Though I do think that this is true to an almost epistemic degree, I don't think that it is entirely the object of faith to replace reason. I think that the Biblical concept of faith carries in it an knowable attribute, theologically speaking. Categorically, it violates the separation of properties in categorical thought. It also seems to be tautological:
e.g., All faith is reason; All reason is faith. This is similar in common logical language, all A is B and all B is A. However, I do not that think reason and faith are completely devoid of one another. Therefore, my basic and ultimate contention with this form is that it belies the relationship with faith and reason.
P2, like P1, has an internal problem with reason. Anselm does seem to separate reason and faith, though they both carry the common goal of bringing anyone to the self-sufficient and self-happy nature of the Holy, i.e., God. Though I agree that these proofs do bring comfort to Christians (sound arguments often do), if often seeks to abstract faith. Faith is not an object of a virtue. It is a virtue in itself. I don't believe that's what Anselmian proofs do. They seek to analyze to nature of conceptual categories and its relationship to metaphysical realities (or realizations). part of that task is the knowledge of the perfect. I won't get into Gaunilo's critique about this "conceptual scheme," but the arguments typically have an object of conceptual reality: God is the greatest most perfect being; it is better to exist than not; therefore, God exist (roughly stated). Therefore, the problem I think with this interpretation of Anselm is that it abstracts faith in a way it should not be abstracted. Reason, I think, is conceptually abstract in these sorts of categories:
"If anyone does not know, either because he has not heard or because he does not believe, that there is one nature, supreme among all existing things, who alone is self-sufficient in his eternal happiness, who through his omnipotent goodness grants and brings it about that all other things exist or have any sort of well-being, and a great many other things that we must believe about God or his creation, I think he could at least convince himself of most of these things by reason alone, if he is even moderately intelligent." (M1)[2]
My ultimate conclusion I think would best characterize Anselm as a philosopher who utilizes faith alongside with reason, though he does not completely ignore their distinct roles in the mind. In other words, faith is not a substandard epistemic position, though reason and faith tend to work together that way.
[1] "fides quaerens intellectum."
[2] Monologion 1
http://plato.stanford.edu/
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